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vaxxers. We show that, during the outbreak of a disease, segregating
people that are against vaccination from the rest of the population
decreases the speed of recovery and may increase the number of cases.
Then, we include endogenous choices based on the tradeoff between
the cost of vaccinating and the risk of getting infected. We show that
the results remain valid under endogenous choices, unless people are
too flexible in determining their identity towards vaccination.
JEL classification codes: C61 Optimization Techniques, Program-
ming Models, Dynamic Analysis – D62 Externalities – D85 Network For-
mation and Analysis: Theory – I12 Health Behavior – I18 Government
Policy, Regulation, Public Health
Keywords: Seasonal diseases; vaccination; anti–vaccination movements;
SI–type model; segregation; endogenous choices.
∗We thank seminar participants at the University of Antwerp, Oxford University, and
at the 2nd EAYE Conference at Paris School of Economics, Bocconi University and Po-
litecnico di Torino. We also would like to thank Fernando Vega Redondo and Melika
Liporace for useful comments and suggestions. Paolo Pin gratefully acknowledge fund-
ing from Italian Ministry of Education Progetti di Rilevante Interesse Nazionale (PRIN)
grants 2015592CTH and 2017ELHNNJ.
1
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
08
52
3v
1 
 [q
-b
io.
PE
]  
16
 Ju
l 2
02
0
1 Introduction
We model an economy that is facing the possible outbreak of a disease,
for which a vaccine is available. This mimics what happens every year for
seasonal flu, but it could also be the case in the near future for Covid19.1
Even before Covid19, vaccination has been almost unanimously consid-
ered the most effective public health intervention by the scientific community
(see e.g. Larson et al., 2016 or Trentini et al., 2017). However, in recent years
there have been many people who either refuse drastically any vaccination
scheme, or reduce or delay the prescribed vaccination. This phenomenon has
become more pronounced in the last decades, especially in Western Europe
and in the US,2 and many public health organizations have issued public
calls to researchers to enhance the understanding of the phenomenon and
its remedies. Even in the present times of Covid19 epidemics, the opposition
to vaccination policies is alive.3
The focus of this paper is on the effects of containment measures that
aim at reducing contacts between vaccinated and unvaccinated people, and
their interaction with vaccination choices of agents and with the dynamics of
anti–vaxxers movements. During the Covid19 outbreak, governments have
implemented very strong and drastic temporary containment and quarantine
policies. However, such stringent policies cannot be permanent measures,
and in normal times the policy makers are able to implement only milder
policies that may segregate people in certain loci of activity. Typical milder
measures of this kind, often implemented in the recent years, are the limita-
tions for attending schools. In order to protect the public, in many countries
recent laws forbid enrollment of non vaccinated kids into public schools, and
this is believed to have brought to an increase to enrollment in more tolerant
private schools.4 On an abstract level, this corresponds to a change in the
1 At present, we know that the virus of Covid 19 mutates very rapidly (Korber et al.,
2020; Pachetti et al., 2020) and that it seems to be seasonal (Carleton and Meng, 2020).
Scientists and politicians are considering the possibility that for the next year it could
become like a seasonal flu that deserves a new vaccine every year: for example, see this
report from April 2020.
2See Larson et al. (2016) for a general and recent cross country comparison. Most
studies are based on the US population: Robison et al. (2012), Smith et al. (2011), Nadeau
et al. (2015) and Phadke et al. (2016) are some of the more recent ones. Funk (2017)
focuses on measles in various European countries. Rey et al. (2018) analyzes the case of
France.
3On this, see the recent reports of Johnson et al. (2020), Ball (2020) and Malik et al.
(2020).
4This phenomenon is documented for California by Silverman and Yang (2019). Recent
news show that similar trends happened in Italy and have been considered a cause of the
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homophily of interactions: the policy has a segregating effect, incentivizing
people with anti-vaccination beliefs to interact more together.
First, we consider a mechanical model in which vaccination choices are
exogenous. The policy parameter that the policy maker can tune is the seg-
regation between two groups of people: those that are against vaccination
and all the others, which we call anti–vax and pro–vax, respectively. We
model this segregation policy as a parameter h ∈ [0, 1], which is the per-
centage of contacts that people cannot have with the other group (because,
for example, their kids are not in the same schools, or they cannot meet in
the same job and leisure places). As a matter of example, consider anti–
vaxxers. Then h can be thought as a policy parameter that regards those
people that are unvaccinated without valid medical reasons, and on whom
the policy maker decides some form of social distancing or segregation. We
think at h as a number that is far from one (which would be the case of total
segregation). This partial segregation policy is implemented against a dis-
ease that is seasonal, before the epidemics actually takes place. In this case,
we show that the policy will backfire: more segregation causes a longer time
before the disease dies out, and more infected people overall. This happens
because the unvaccinated people, that are more frequent in the anti–vax
community, because of the partial segregation policy, have denser contacts
between themselves and serve as an incubator for the disease.
In the second part of the paper we endogenize the vaccination choices
of people. Vaccination choices are taken before the disease spreads out. We
view this as a classical trade–off between the perceived cost of vaccinating
and the expected cost of getting sick. In the model, the difference between
anti–vaxxers and pro–vaxxers is only in the perceived costs of vaccination.
We show that even if we endogenize these choices, the qualitative predictions
of the mechanical model are still valid: A policy that increases segregation
is counterproductive.
Finally, we endogenize the choice of people on whether to be anti–vaxxer
or pro–vaxxer. This choice is modelled as the result of social pressure, as
the transmission of a cultural trait. There is a well-documented fact about
vaccine hesitancy that seems hard to reconcile with strategic models: the
geographical and social clustering of vaccine hesitancy. Various studies,
reviewed e.g. by Dube´ and MacDonald (2016) find that people are more
likely to have positive attitudes toward vaccination if their family or peers
have. This is particularly evident in the case of specific religious confessions
that hold anti-vaccination prescriptions, and tend to be very correlated with
measles outbreak in Manhattan in April 2019.
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social contacts and geographical clustering. These studies, though observa-
tional and making no attempt to assess causal mechanisms, present evidence
at odds with the strategic model: if the main reason not to vaccinate is free
riding, people should be less likely to vaccine if close to many vaccinated
people, and not vice-versa. In addition, Lieu et al. (2015) show that vaccine
hesitant people are more likely to communicate together than with other
people. Edge et al. (2019) document that vaccination patterns in a network
of social contacts of physicians in Manchester hospitals are correlated with
being close in the network. It has been also shown that, in many cases,
providing more information does not make vaccine hesitant people change
their mind (on this, see Nyhan et al., 2013, 2014 and Nyhan and Reifler,
2015). However, people do change their mind about vaccination schemes,
but they do so under psychological rules that look irrational, as documented
recently by Brewer et al. (2017), for example. In a review of the literature,
Yaqub et al. (2014) finds that lack of knowledge is cited less than distrust
in public authorities as a reason to be vaccine-hesitant. This is true both
among the general public and professionals: in a study of French physicians,
Verger et al. (2015) finds only 50% of the interviewed trusted public health
authorities. They both find a correlation between vaccine hesitancy and the
use or practice of alternative medicine.
When we fully endogenize the choices of people (both membership to
groups and vaccination choices) we find that the predictions of the simple
mechanical model remain valid only if the groups of the society are rigid
enough, and people do not change easily their mind about vaccines. If
instead people are more prone to move between the anti–vaxxers and pro–
vaxxers groups, then segregation policies can have positive effects. The
simple intuition for this is that when anti–vax people are forced to interact
more together, they internalize the higher risk of getting infected, and as a
result they are more prone to become pro–vax.
We contribute to three lines of literature, related to three steps of our
analysis highlighted above: the analysis of the effects of segregation in epi-
demiological models, the economics literature on vaccination and its equi-
librium effects, and the literature on diffusion of social norms and cultural
traits.
The medical and biological literature using SI-type models is wide and
a review of it is beyond our scopes. We limit ourselves to consider that
recently some papers have considered dynamic processes with superficial
similarity to ours. The closest in this respect is Pananos et al. (2017), which
studies markers of critical transitions in the dynamics of a three equation
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model including epidemics and infection.
The literature on strategic immunization has analyzed models where
groups are given, and the immunization choice is chosen, as in Galeotti and
Rogers (2013), or both the immunization and the level of interaction are
endogenous, as in Goyal and Vigier (2015). At an abstract level, the differ-
ence with respect to our setting is that we endogenize the group partition,
through a dynamics of diffusion of social norms.
The economics of social norms and cultural traits is a lively field, sur-
veyed by Bisin and Verdier (2011). Common to this literature is the use
of simple, often non-strategic, dynamic models of evolution of preferences.
We adopt this framework, finding it useful despite the differences we discuss
later. A paper close to ours is Panebianco and Verdier (2017), that consid-
ers how social networks affect cultural transmission, with a more concrete
network specification through degree distributions.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the mechani-
cal model and shows its results. Sections 3 and 4 introduce respectively
endogenous choices and endogenous group membership, deriving our ana-
lytical results for theses cases. We conclude in Section 5. In the appendices
we consider extensions of the model (Appendices A, B and C) and we prove
our results (Appendix D).
2 Mechanical model
We consider a simple SIS model with vaccination and with two groups of
agents, analogous to the setup in Galeotti and Rogers (2013). To understand
the main forces at play, we start by taking all the decisions of agents as
exogenous, and we focus on the infection dynamics. In the following sections
we endogenize the choices of the players.
Our society is composed by a continuum of agents of mass 1, which is
partitioned in two groups of agents. To begin with, in this section this
partition is exogenous. Agents in each group are characterized by their
attitude towards vaccination. In details, following a popular terminology,
we label the two groups with a, for anti-vaxxers, and with v, for vaxxers.
Thus, the set of the two groups is G := {a, v}, with g ∈ G being the generic
group. Let qa ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of anti-vaxxers in the society, and
qv = 1 − qa the fraction of vaxxers. To ease the notation, when this does
not create ambiguity, we write q for qa.
People in the two groups meet each others with an homophilous bias.
We model this by assuming that an agent of any of the two groups has a
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probability h to meet someone from her own group, and a probability 1− h
to meet someone else randomly drawn from the whole society.5 This implies
that anti-vaxxers meet each others at a rate of q˜a := h + (1 − h)qa, while
vaxxers meet each others at a rate of q˜v := h+(1−h)qv = h+(1−h)(1−qa).
Note that h is the same for both groups, but if qa 6= qv and h > 0, then
q˜a 6= q˜v.
For each g ∈ G, let xg ∈ [0, 1] denote the fraction of agents in group
g that are vaccinated against our generic disease. It is natural to assume,
without loss of generality, that xa < xv, and by now this is actually the only
difference characterizing the two groups. Let µ be the recovery rate of the
disease, while its infectiveness is normalized to 1.
2.1 The dynamical system
Setting the evolution of the epidemics in continuous time, we study the
fraction of infected people in each group. When this does not generate
ambiguity, we drop time indexes from the variables. For each i ∈ G, let ρi
be the share of infected agents in group i. Since vaccinated agents cannot
get infected, we have ρa ∈ [0, 1− xa] and ρv ∈ [0, 1− xv], respectively.
The differential equations of the system are given by:
ρ˙a =
(
1− ρa − xa)(q˜aρa + (1− q˜a)ρv)− ρaµ;
ρ˙v =
(
1− ρv − xv)(q˜vρv + (1− q˜v)ρa)− ρvµ. (1)
For each g ∈ G, (1 − ρg − xg) ∈ [0, 1] represents the set of agents who are
neither vaccinated, nor infected, and thus susceptible of being infected by
other infected agents. Moreover, the share of infected agents met by vaxxers
and anti-vaxxers is given by
(
q˜aρa+(1− q˜a)ρv
)
and by
(
q˜vρv +(1− q˜v)ρa
)
,
respectively. Finally, ρaµ and ρvµ are the recovered agents in each group.
Result 1. The system (1) always admits a trivial steady state: (ρa1, ρ
v
1) :=
(0, 0). There exists a µˆ(h) > 0 such that (i) if µ < µˆ(h), (0, 0) is unstable,
whereas (ii) if µ > µˆ(h), (0, 0) is stable.6 
5h is the imbreeding homophily index, as defined in Coleman (1958), Marsden (1987),
McPherson et al. (2001) and Currarini et al. (2009). It can be interpreted in several ways,
as an outcome of choices or of opportunities. As we assume that h can be affected by
policies, we can interpret it as the amount of time in which agents are kept segregated by
group, while in the remaining time that they have they meet uniformly at random.
6 This value of µˆ is µˆ = 1
2
(T + ∆) ∈ [0, 1], where T = q˜a(1 − xa) + q˜v(1 − xv) and
∆ =
√
T 2 − 4h(1− xa)(1− xv).
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This result is obtained in the standard way, by setting to zero the two
right–hand side parts of the system in (1) and solving for ρa and ρv. The
formal passages are in Appendix D, as those of the other results that follow.
In the remaining of the paper, we focus on the case in which µ > µˆ, be-
cause it is consistent with diseases that are not endemic but show themselves
in episodic or seasonal waves. For those diseases, the society lays for most
of its time in a steady state where no one is infected. However, exogenous
shocks increase temporarily the number of infected people until eventually
the disease dies out, as it happens, for example, for the seasonal outbreaks
of flu.
Note also that µˆ(h) is decreasing in h, so that we highlight a first im-
portant role for h in the comparative statics: if h increases, we risk that a
disease that was not endemic, because µ < µˆ(h), becomes so because µˆ(h)
decreases with h, and the sign of the inequality is reversed. Indeed, a higher
homophily counterbalances the negative effect that the recovery rate µ has
on the epidemic outbreak.
2.2 Cumulative Infection
The main focus of our interest is to see what is the welfare loss due to the
epidemics, and how this depends on the policy parameter h. In our simple
setting, the welfare loss is measured by the total number of infected people
over time, that is cumulative infection. For analytical tractability, we
will approximate the dynamics of outbreaks with the linearized version of
the dynamics ρˆ, that satisfies:
˙ˆρt = J
(
ρˆat
ρˆvt
)
ρˆ0 =
(
ρa0
ρv0
)
(2)
where J is the Jacobian matrix of (1) calculated in the (0, 0) steady state,
and (ρa0, ρ
v
0) is the initial magnitude of the outbreak.
The cumulative infection in the two groups and in the overall population
∆ is always positive and it is increasing in q. µˆ is always between 0 and 1. It is increasing
in h and in q, its value is 1− xv + q(xv − xa) for h = 0 and 1− xa for h→ 1. µˆ is always
between 0 and 1. It is increasing in h and in q, its value is 1− xv + q(xv − xa) for h = 0
and 1− xa for h→ 1.
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is: 
CIa :=
∫ ∞
0
ρˆa(t)dt
CIv :=
∫ ∞
0
ρˆv(t)dt
CI := qaCIa + (1− qa)CIv
(3)
Note that, since qa is fixed, CI takes into account both the number of
infected agents of each group at each period, and also the length of the
outbreak. In the range of parameters for which (0, 0) is stable, all the
integrals are finite, so here we do not add discounting, for simplicity. We will
explore the implications of the introduction of time preferences in Section
2.3 below.
The expressions can be found Lemma 1 in the Appendix. To understand
the mechanics that regulates the share of agents that get infected during
the outbreak, let us consider three different types of initial conditions: The
epidemics starts (i) among vaxxers (ρv0 > 0 and ρ
a
0 = 0), (ii) among anti-
vaxxers (ρv0 = 0 and ρ
a
0 > 0), and (iii) in both groups symmetrically (ρ
v
0 =
ρa0 > 0).
First, we analyse which group has more infected agents throughout the
epidemics.
Result 2 (Who is better off?). The cumulative number of infected agents
is such that CIa ≥ CIv if and only if:
−ρa0(1− xv) + ρv0(1− xa) + µ(ρa0 − ρv0) ≥ 0 (4)
The result simply follows from comparing the expressions for CIa and
CIv in Lemma 1. The expression (4) underlines the roles of the parameters
in determining the welfare of the groups. The expression is increasing in
xv and decreasing in xa: the gap in vaccinations tends to penalize the less
vaccined group. Since the cumulative infection is an intertemporal measure,
though, the initial conditions concur also in determining which group is
better off: the difference is increasing in ρa0 and decreasing in ρ
v
0.
7 µ regulates
the importance of this effect in the discrepancy of initial conditions: the
larger µ, the shorter the epidemics, the larger the importance of the initial
conditions. In particular we have:
i) if the outbreak starts among vaxxers, vaxxers have larger cumulative
infection;
7Because the stability assumptions imply −1 + xv + µ > 0 and −1 + xa + µ > 0
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ii) if the outbreak starts among antivaxxers, antivaxxers have larger cu-
mulative infection;
iii) if the outbreak starts symmetrically in both groups, the group with less
vaccined has the largest cumulative infection (under our assumptions,
antivaxxers).
The following result is obtained applying definitions from (3) and taking
derivatives.
Result 3 (Effect of h and qa).
a) CI is increasing in h if and only if CIa > CIv
b) CI is increasing in q if and only if CIa > CIv
In particular, the marginal effects of h and qa for different outbreak types
are those reported in Table 1. 
If the outbreak is among· · ·
vaxxers anti–vaxxers both, symmetrically
the effect ∂CI
a
∂h < 0,
∂CIv
∂h > 0,
∂CIa
∂h > 0,
∂CIv
∂h < 0,
∂CIa
∂h > 0,
∂CIv
∂h < 0,
of h is: ∂CI∂h < 0
∂CI
∂h > 0
∂CI
∂h > 0
the effect ∂CI
a
∂qa < 0,
∂CIv
∂qa < 0,
∂CIa
∂qa > 0,
∂CIv
∂qa > 0,
∂CIa
∂qa > 0,
∂CIv
∂qa > 0,
of qa is: ∂CI∂qa < 0
∂CI
∂qa > 0
∂CI
∂qa > 0
Table 1: Marginal effects of h and qa on CIa, CIv, and CI, when there is
an outbreak among vaxxers, anti–vaxxers, or symmetrically in both groups.
Let us first focus on the effects of homophily (first row of Table 1). First
notice that, if the outbreak happens just in one of the two groups, homophily
protects the group that is not infected ex ante. So, intuitively, the outbreak
has the strongest effect in terms of infected agents in the group in which
the outbreak has taken place. The effect of homophily on the overall CI is
however ambiguous and depends on the initial condition.
Consider first the case in which the outbreak takes place among vaxxers.
Then, at the beginning, the infection takes over among the group with the
highest vaccination rate, since xv > xa. The higher the homophily h, the
more vaxxers interact among each others, and thus the more the infection
remains within the group that is more protected against it. For this reason,
the higher h, the less the CI. For the opposite reason, if the outbreaks takes
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place in the anti-vaxxers group, homophily makes infection stay more in the
less protected group, and CI increases.
If the outbreak takes place in both groups, the two different forces mix
up, and to have a null effect of both homophily and q we need the initial
conditions to satisfy: ρa0(µ+x
v−1) = ρv0(µ+xa−1). Note that this condition
is (4) with the equality sign, so that CIa = CIv. If however we have
symmetric initial condition, the overall cumulative infections increases in
homophily. This derives from the fact that, at the beginning of the outbreak,
the share of infected vaxxers and anti-vaxxers is the same. However, vaxxers
are more protected than anti-vaxxers, and this lack of protection of anti-
vaxxers makes the epidemics spread more also to vaxxers, so that CI is
increasing in h.
To understand the role of qa on the CI (second row of Table 1), recall
that a higher qa means a higher share of agents less protected against the
disease. Consider first the case in which the outbreak takes place in the
vaxxers group. Then, a higher qa means that the number of infected agents,
which are in the v group, is lower. Thus, all CI measures are decreasing in
qa. For the opposite reasoning, all CI measures are increasing in qa if the
outbreak takes place in the anti-vaxxers group. If the outbreak is symmetric,
then the two forces mix. However, if qa increases, the share of agents who are
not protected against the disease increases, and thus CI measures increase.
2.3 Time preferences
In this section we explore the implications of the degree of impatience of the
planner on the evaluation of the impact of homophily. Time preferences can
be crucial for the planner. As we have seen, for example, in the Covid19
epidemics, the planner, given a CI, may prefer not to have all infected agents
soon because of some capacity constraints of the health system.
For example, Figure 1 shows the time evolution of the infection of both
groups, and overall society’s in case of an outbreak among the vaxxers. In
this case, since the outbreak starts among the vaxxers it is among this group
that infection is higher initially, while eventually infection becomes larger
among the antivaxxxers, due to the lower vaccination levels. What is worse
in terms of cumulative infection will depend on how the planner trades off
today and tomorrow infections: the more he is patient, the more the infection
among antivaxxers will become prominent. Moreover, since in our setting
the impact of segregation polices depend on the relative amount of infected
in the two groups, as specified in Result 3, in our context the time preference
will also be crucial for the evaluation of the impact of homophily on total
10
antivax
vax
tot
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t
0.005
0.010
0.015
ρ
Figure 1: CI as a function of time in case the outbreak starts among vaxxers
(ρa0 = 0). Here ρ
v
0 = 0.1, xa = 0.3, xv = 0.9, q = 0.3, h = 0.5, µ = 1.
cumulative infection.
Thus, we first define the discounted cumulative infection:
CIa :=
∫ ∞
0
e−βtρa(t)dt
CIv :=
∫ ∞
0
e−βtρv(t)dt
CI := qaCIa + (1− qa)CIv
(5)
where β > 0 is the discount rate. Analytically, things turn out to be very
simple, due to the exponential nature of the solutions, as the following ob-
servation lays out.
Result 4. Discounted cumulative infections are equivalent to cumulative
infections in a model with recovery rate µ′ = µ+ β.
This is not too surprising: µ is a measure of how fast the epidemics dies
out, and β is a measure of how fast the welfare loss dies out. The previous
result carries on even when, as we do in the following sections, choices on
vaccination and on types are made endogenous.
The impact can be made more precise if we stick to exogenous choices,
as is done below.
Result 5. In the model with discounting:
CIa ≥ CIv if and only if −ρa0(1−xv) +ρv0(1−xa) + (µ+β)(ρa0−ρv0) ≥ 0
The proof is immediate from the previous result and Result 4 and In
details:
11
1. An increase in the degree of impatience β makes initial conditions
more important in the welfare evaluation. For example, without time
preferences, we may have that ρa0 < ρ
a
0 but CI
a > CIv, because the
difference in vaccinated dominates the difference in initial outbreak.
However, if time preferences are introduced, or β gets larger, a planner
may evaluate that CIa < CIv because she is putting more weight on
the earlier moments of the epidemics.
2. An increase in the degree of impatience β can change the impact of
homophily, as illustratd in Figure 2. To understand this point, given
a population share q, there exists a β such that homophily does not
impact the CI (with time preferences). In this CI, groups get infected
at different rates along time. As we change β, the planner gives more
weight on the group getting infected earlier. As we have seen earlier,
homophily plays a role in this process, keeping the infection more into
each group. In the figure, q = .3 so that there are more vaxxers
than anti-vaxxers, and vaxxers are also more vaccinated. Thus, the
more the planner is impatient, the more she is sarisfied by the fact
that the majority of agents (vaxxers) are less infected when homophily
increases.
Figure 2: Cumulative infection as a function of homophily for different values
of time preference. Here µ = 0.7, xa = 0.2, xv = 0.9, q = 0.3.
2.4 Convergence time
One relevant policy measure during an outbreak, together with the CI, is
the time of recovery, that is the time to the convergence back to the (0, 0)
equilibrium. We now discuss how homophily affects this convergence time.
We consider as a measure of convergence time the magnitude of the leading
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eigenvalue, which in this case is the one with the smallest absolute value.
This is because the solution of our linear system is a linear combination of
exponential terms whose coefficients are the eigenvalues (which are negative
by stability). Hence when t is large the dominant term is the one containing
the eigenvalue which has smallest absolute value.8
Result 6. Consider a perturbation around the stable steady state (0, 0).
The time of convergence (as measured by the leading eigenvalue) back to
(0, 0) is increasing in h.
This result shows that homophily, by making the society more segre-
gated, makes the convergence to the zero infection benchmark slower once
an outbreak occurs. This is obtained analyzing the eigenvalues of the Ja-
cobian matrix, computed in the steady state. All results are obtained an-
alytically (see Appendix), and the resulting eigenvalues are decreasing in
absolute value in h (as also shown, for a specific parametrization.
If we look at the effects of other parameters, we have that the eigenvalues
are increasing in absolute value in both xa and xv. This is because a larger
number of vaccinated agents means a smaller space for infection to diffuse.
Finally, since xa < xv, then the smallest eigenvalue is decreasing (in absolute
value) in qa, while the largest eigenvalue is increasing. Since the long run
dynamics (i.e. asymptotic convergence) depends on the smallest eigenvalue,
this means that the dynamics is asymptotically slower the larger the fraction
of the population with less vaccinated agents.
Results 1, 3 and 6 in this section provide clear implications that should
be taken into account when considering policies that affect the level of ho-
mophily h in the society. Any increase in segregation between vaxxers and
anti–vaxxers may induce the disease to become endemic. Additionally, a
larger h, if there is a temporary outbreak, will slow down the recovery time
and in some cases (i.e. when the outbreak does not start only among vaxxers)
it may increase the cumulative infection caused by the disease.
8We should be careful, though, because this is true non–generically outside of the
eigendirection of the second eigenvector. Indeed, in our case the eigenvectors are:
e1 =
(
− (1− x
v) q˜a + (xa − 1) q˜a + ∆
2 (1− xv) (1− q˜a) , 1
)
and
e2 =
(− (1− xv) q˜a − (xa − 1) q˜a + ∆
2 (1− xv) (1− q˜a) , 1
)
.
So, we can see that the first eigendirection does not intersect the first quadrant, while the
second does. Hence, we should remember that the first eigenvalue is a measure of speed
of convergence only generically, outside of the eigendirection identified above.
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When applied to the real world, the results of this section can be seen
as first order effects, because in general a policy that changes h may have
effects also on xa, xv and qa. Indeed, in the following sections, we endogenize
the shares of vaccinated, and the shares of vaxxers and antivaxxers. The
outcomes then depend also on the second order effects: the interaction of
the impact of homophily on the endogenous variables.
3 Vaccination choices
In this section we start introducing elements of endogeneity. First of all we
consider vaccination choices, to make the shares xa and xv endogenous. To
begin with, we still consider the partition of our society in anti-vaxxers and
vaxxers, qa and qv, as exogenously fixed (we will relax this assumption in
the next section).
We model the behavior of agents who consider the trade-off between pay-
ing some fixed cost for vaccinating, or incurring the risk of getting infected,
and thus paying with some probability a cost associated to health. We need
to set some assumptions about vaccination costs and agents’ perception of
the risk of being infected. Now that xa and xv are endogenous, and it is
this difference in the perception of costs that characterizes the difference
between the two groups.9
Vaccination costs Vaxxers and anti-vaxxers have different perceptions
about vaccination costs. For vaxxers we assume that vaccination costs are
cv ∼ U [0, 1], while for anti-vaxxers ca ∼ U [d, 1 + d], with d > 0. This is to
say that anti-vaxxers perceive a higher cost of getting a vaccine.
Risk of infection We assume that agents think about the risk of infec-
tion as proportional to the fraction of unvaccinated people that they meet.
This is reasonable, because they form a belief before the actual outbreak
occurs (e.g., agents decide to vaccinate against flu a few months before win-
ter). Agents multiply this fraction of unvaccinated people by a factor k > 0,
that represents the perceived damage from the disease, which is the same for
the two groups. Let σv be the share of unvaccinated people met by vaxxers,
9See, for example, Bricker and Justice (2019) and Greenberg et al. (2019) for a recent
analysis of the anti–vaxxers arguments: Those are mostly based on conspiracy theories
that attribute hidden costs to the vaccination practice, and not so much on minimizing
the effects of getting infected. Our model would not change dramatically if we attribute
the difference in perception on the costs of becoming sick (see equations (8) and (9)), but
we stick to the first interpretation because it makes the computations cleaner.
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then
σv = q˜v(1− xv) + (1− q˜v)(1− xa) , (6)
so that vaxxers perceive the risk of infection to be kσv. Similarly
σa = q˜a(1− xa) + (1− q˜a)(1− xv) , (7)
so that anti–vaxxers perceive the risk of infection to be kσa. Now, only
those for which costs are lower than perceived risk decide to vaccinate. So:
x∗v = min{kσv, 1} , (8)
while for an anti–vaxxers we have
x∗a = max{0,min{kσa − d, 1}} . (9)
The two solutions are both interior, for any value of the other parameters,
whenever d < min
{
1
k2
, kk+1
}
, and we call this the interiority condition,
which is analyzed in depth in Appendix A. From now on we use interiority
condition as a maintaned assumption for the remainder of the paper. In this
case, equations (6)–(9) imply a system that provides
xa = 1− 1 + dq
a
1 + k
− d(1− q
a)
1 + hk
xv = 1− 1 + dq
a
1 + k
+
dqa
1 + hk
. (10)
In what follows we focus on the interior solutions. In Appendix B we
analyze numerically the case in which xv = 0, and we see that the qualitative
results are analogous to those that we present here.
First of all, we note that (i) xv > xa - since vaxxers perceive a lower
vaccination costs than anti-vaxxers; (ii) xa is increasing in h while xv is
decreasing in h - since a higher homophily makes vaxxers more in contact
with agents who are less susceptible than anti-vaxxers and, as a consequence,
(xv − xa) is decreasing in h; (iii) xa and xv are increasing in qa - since the
higher the share of anti-vaxxers, the more agents are in touch with other
subjects at risk of infection ; (iv) the total number of vaccinated people is
qaxa+(1−qa)xv = k−dqa1+k , it is independent of h, but decreasing in qa; this is
due to a Simpson paradoxical effect: both groups vaccinate more, but since
anti-vaxxers increase, in the aggregate vaccination decreases.
We can examine also cumulative infections, in a neighborhood of the sta-
ble steady state (0, 0). We limit ourselves to the symmetric initial condition
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ρa0 = ρ
v
0, that can be compared with Result 3, looking at the third column of
Table 1. Also, analytical tractability is obtained only for values of h that are
small, as would be the effect of a policy that limits contacts between vaxxers
and anti-vaxxers only in few of the daily activities (e.g. only in schools).
Proposition 1. Consider a perturbation around (0, 0), such that ρa0 = ρ
v
0 >
0. Then, there exists h¯ > 0 such that, if h < h¯:
(i) ∂xa/∂h = −∂xv/∂h;
(ii) CI is increasing in h;
(iii) CI is increasing in qa (but the marginal effect is lower than in the
exogenous case of Result 3).
This proposition analyzes what happens for an outbreak that is sym-
metric in the two groups, when homophily is low enough. We have already
seen above that the effect of homophily is opposite for xa and xv. Here we
find that the magnitude of the effects is the same for both groups, and that
the higher the homophily, the higher CI. Thus, homophily policy does not
seem to be a good policy to be implemented in these cases. At the same
time, the more the anti-vaxxers, the more the number of infected agents.
To complete our analysis of endogenous choices, in the next section we
endogenize also the partition between the two groups.
4 Endogenous groups
In previous section we have illustrated the tradeoff faced by agents between
two different costs: the act of vaccinating, and the risk of being infected,
which is in turn based on the fraction of unvaccinated agents they expect to
meet, σv and σa. We now consider how the share of vaxxers and anti-vaxxers
change with time, that is how q is determined. Our aim here is to offer a
simple and flexible theory of the diffusion of opinions to be integrated in
our main epidemics model. As explained in the Introduction, the empirical
observations that important drivers of vaccination opinions are peer effects
and cultural dimensions in general leads us to discard strategic models,
where the decision of not vaccinating descends from strategic considerations.
Given the complex pattern of psychological effects in play we opt for a simple
reduced form model capturing the main trade-offs. In particular, we are
going to assume the diffusion of traits in the population to be driven by
expected advantages: the payoff advantage that individuals in each group
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estimate to have with respect to individuals in the other. This is made
precise by the next definition.
Definition 1 (Expected advantage). Consider an individual in group a.
Define ∆Ua as the Expected advantage individual a estimates to have with
respect to individuals in group v. Specifically:
∆Ua = Ua→a − Ua→v
Ua→a = −Ec [(c+ d)1kσa<c + kσa1kσa≥c]
Ua→v = −Ec [(c+ d)1kσv<c + kσv1kσv≥c]
(11)
(12)
(13)
where Ua→a is the payoff of individuals with trait a evaluated by an in-
dividual with trait a, while Ua→v is the payoff of individuals with trait v
evaluated by individuals with trait a. ∆Uv is defined analogously, and can
be found in Appendix C.2.
Agents in each group perceive a differential in utilities from being of their
own group and being of the other group. Note that, apart from the bias d,
agents correctly evaluate all other quantities, including the risks from the
disease of the two groups, kσv and kσa. Indeed, even if both groups evaluate
the choice of the other group as suboptimal, this perceived difference can be
negative for anti–vaxxers, because they understand that vaxxers have less
chances of getting infected.
To clarify Definition 1, consider Figure 3. The black line is the disutility
of agents in groups a, as a function of the cost c, as perceived by agents
in group a. The shape of this line mirrors the fact that an agent in group
a undertakes vaccination only if her costs are in the [0, kσa − d] interval,
in which a agents incur in a disutility c + d. If c > kσa − d, a agents do
not vaccinate, and the disutility is the risk of infection, which is kσa. The
grey area below this curve is then Ua→a. Consider now the red line. This
represents the disutiliy of agents in group v as perceived by agents in group
a. In particular, agents in group v have a different perception of costs with
respect to agents in group a, and so take different choices. In particular
they vaccine in the [0, kσv] interval, while if they are in the [kσv, 1] interval
they do not vaccinates and incur risk of infection. Note, however, that this
is the evaluation from the perspective of agents in group a, and thus the
cost of vaccination is c instead of c + d. Hence Ua→v is the area below the
red curve. The difference ∆Ua is given by the red area minus the blue area.
Uv→v and Uv→v are computed accordingly. The details of the calculation
and the corresponding figure are in Appendices C.1 and C.2.
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cost c
disutility
d
kσa
1kσa − d kσv
kσv Disutility of v as perceived by a
Disutility of a as perceived by a
Figure 3: Composition of ∆Ua. The graph represents the disutility incurred
by an individual as a function of its cost c. ∆Ua is the red area minus the
blue area.
To ease notation, let q = qa. Then, we make the following assumption
over the population dynamics
Assumption 1. Given an α ∈ R, the level of q increases when qα∆Ua >
(1− q)α∆Uv and it decreases when qα∆Ua < (1− q)α∆Uv.
Clearly, the implication of the previous assumption is that the resting
points of the dynamics are such that qα∆Ua = (1−q)α∆Uv, but stability has
to be addressed. The simplest example of dynamics satisfying Assumption
1 is:
q˙ = q(1− q)[qα∆Ua − (1− q)α∆Uv] ,
but we allow also for any non linear generalization.
The dynamics obtained from Assumption 1 generalizes the standard
workhorse model in cultural transmission, the one by Bisin and Verdier
(2001), in two ways: (i) endogenizing the socialization payoffs, as from Defi-
nition 1, and (ii) introducing a parameter α regulating the flexibility agents
have in changing their identity via social learning. Indeed, at the limit
α → ∞, q˙ = 0 and types are fixed. Note also that α regulates also the
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strength of cultural substitution, a phenomenon often observed in cultural
transmission settings: the tendency of members of minorities, to preserve
their culture, to exert larger effort to spread their trait.10 Thus, we are
able to encompass different types of social dynamics. (i) If α = 0 this is
a standard replicator dynamics (see e.g. Weibull, 1997). (ii) If α < 0, the
model displays cultural substitution, as most standard cultural transmission
models. Moreover, the more α is negative, the more there is substitution. In
particular, if α = −1 the dynamics has the same steady state and stability
properties as the dynamics of Bisin and Verdier (2001).11 (iii) If α > 0, the
model displays cultural complementarity, so that the smaller the minority,
the less the effort exerted, and the less the minority survives. Note that
cultural complementarity is increasing in α.
The environment of social influence is not only shaped by physical con-
tacts and it is not the same of the epidemic diffusion of the actual disease
(because in the real world many contacts are online and are channeled by
social media). Hence, any policy on h can have a limited effect on it, be-
cause for us h is a restriction on the physical meeting opportunities. As a
consequence, h does not appear explicitly in Assumption 1.
If ∆Ua = 0, naturally there will be no antivaxxers. This will happen
if for example the bias d is very high, or homophily is very high, so that
the increased infection risk from being an antivax (the blue area in Figure
3) is so large that no one wants to be an antivax. This is of course an
uninteresting case, so from now on we are going to assume the following:
Assumption 2 (Interiority conditions). xa, xv, and ∆U
a are interior
(details in terms of exogenous parameters are in the Appendix A).
The following result shows that only the case α < 0 is of some interest
for the analysis, because in the other cases the population become all of one
type, with q∗ = 0 or q∗ = 1.
Proposition 2. Under the interiority conditions: (i) If α ≥ 0 there are no
interior stable steady states of the dynamics for q. (ii) If α < 0, there exists
a q∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that q∗α∆Ua = (1− q∗)α∆Uv. Moreover, there is always
a stable steady state and there exists a threshold h such that, for h < h, the
steady state is unique and stable.
10See Bisin and Verdier (2011).
11To be precise, the model by Bisin and Verdier (2001) refers to intergenerational trans-
mission. In the Appendix we show how a similar equation can be recovered in a context
of intragenerational cultural transmission
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q
Figure 4: q as a function of h. d = 0.5, k = 1, µ = 1. The range of h is
restricted as prescribed by the interiority conditions A
Again, the proof of this result is obtained with standard methods, ap-
plying the implicit function theorem to the condition from Assumption 1,
looking at results for h→ 0, and using the continuity of the system to prove
that results hold in an interval [0, h¯) for h. The equilibrium level of q can be
computed analytically only in the case α = −1 (which is the case in which
the model is equivalent to Bisin and Verdier, 2001) and for h = 0, since the
differences in payoffs across groups become null, and q∗ = 12 .
We are now interested in the effect of an increase in homophily on q.
Figure 4 shows, on the basis of numerical examples with α = −12 , α = −1,
and α = −3, that homophily has a negative effect on q∗ and that this result
seems to extend to any α < 0.
We can actually prove it analytically for small values of h.
Proposition 3. Under the interiority conditions, and if α < 0 there is a
threshold h such that, for h < h, q∗ is decreasing in h in the unique and
stable steady state.
The intuition is that a larger h magnifies the negative effects of being
anti-vaxxers in terms of infection, relatively to vaxxers. This is internalized
in the cultural dynamics, via the ∆Us. This long run effect of h on anti-
vaxxers share is one of the few positive effects of segregating policies.
As we have done in the preliminary model with exogenous choices, we can
analyze the effects of homophily on the cumulative infection, when the initial
perturbation is symmetric across both groups (see Result 3, summarized in
the third column of Table 1). We find that the effects depend on the mag-
20
nitude of α, the parameter regulating how agents are rigid/prone towards
social influence.
Proposition 4. Consider the model with endogenous q, α < 0 and interi-
ority conditions. Consider an outbreak affecting both groups symmetrically,
starting from the unique stable steady state and h = 0. Then, there exists a
threshold α such that:
• if α < α, CI is increasing in h ( dCIdh ∣∣h=0 > 0);
• if α > α, CI is decreasing in h ( dCIdh ∣∣h=0 < 0).
With this proposition we consider the effects of the introduction of some
form of segregation policy, taking also into account the cultural dynamics.
This means that if α is large in magnitude (the first bullet point, since
α is negative) then the society is rigid in its opinions, and the effects are
qualitatively the same that we would have if types and vaccination choices
were fixed (Result 3). If instead α is small in magnitude (the second bullet
point), then the reaction of q∗ to a policy change of h is large, and this reverts
the effect: cumulative infection is decreasing in homophily. In this last case,
the effects of a policy based on partial segregation will be the desired ones.
In this respect, how agents are subjected to social influence can revert the
effects of a policy based on homophily. Figure 5 shows this effect for two
values of α < 0. These are also compared with what would happen, with
the same parameters, under the assumptions of Result 3 (all choices are
exogenous) and Proposition 1 (only vaccination choices are endogenous, but
groups are fixed). The figure shows that, only when α is negative and small
in absolute value, the cumulative infections decreases in homophily. In all
the other cases a policy based on homophily can increase the cumulative
infection at various degrees.
The intuition for the different marginal effects of h on cumulative in-
fection seems to lie on the marginal effects on the speed of the dynamics,
via the first eigenvalue (see Result 6), as Figure 6 illustrates: the cases in
which cumulative infection increases with h are those in which the leading
eigenvalue is decreasing in magnitude, and vice versa.
Note that Result 4 about the discount rates of a policy maker are still
valid with endogenous choices, as we discussed in Section 2.3.
5 Conclusion
The problem of vaccine skepticism is a complex one, that requires analy-
sis from multiple angles: psychological, medical, social. In this paper we
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Figure 5: Cumulative infection in the three models. Whenever exogenous, q,
xa and xv are set using the median value of h = 0.1. The other parameters
are set at k = 2, d = 0.5, µ = 1, ρa0 = ρ
v
0 = 0.1.
propose an analysis of the trade-offs faced by a policymaker interested in
minimizing infection in a world with vaxxers and antivaxxers, having avail-
able a policy inducing some degree of segregation, or homophily, h. The key
observation is that reducing contact with antivaxxers may be counterpro-
ductive for vaxxers and for the society as a whole, because it slows down
the dynamics of the disease to its steady state, if there is an outbreak. Ho-
mophily actually increases the duration of the outbreaks, and depending on
the impatience of the planner this might crucially change the impact of the
policy. Further, if cultural types are endogenous, the intensity of cultural
substitution is key in determining the impact of the policy. Our results
suggest that the study of policy responses to the spread of antivax ideas
would benefit from trying to pin down more precisely the intensity of this
mechanisms.
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Figure 6: Left panel: Cumulative infection as function of homophily in
the interior equilibrium. The other parameters are set at k = 2, d = 0.5,
µ = 1, ρa0 = ρ
v
0 = 0.1. Right panel: corresponding leading eigenvalue of
dynamical system as a function of h.
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Appendices
A Interiority conditions
In section 3 we include endogenous choices about vaccinations, using two
parameters, d and k, for the beliefs about the expected costs of vaccina-
tion and of becoming infected. We assume interiority conditions, which are
essentially the conditions for which ∆Ua > 0 (from (11)). The conditions
under which ∆V a is positive is 2hk(hk+1)k+1 < d. For this to be compatible
with xa and xv being interior, we need d < min{ 1k , 1k(1+k)}, hence we need
also 2h(1 + hk) < 1
k2
. So in addition to k high enough we also need h small
enough. Figure 7 shows the regions in the h–d plane for which the interiority
conditions are satisfied, depending on the value of k.
k=0.5
k=1
k=2
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
h
d
Figure 7: Region of parameters where all endogenous variables are interior.
µ is fixed to 1.
B Analysis of corner solution xa = 0
In this section we explore the case in which the interiority conditions are
not satisfied, and d is large enough so that the unique equilibrium in the
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vaccination game is:
xa = 0 ,
xv =
k
(h− 1)kq + k + 1 ,
(14)
(15)
provided d < 1/k so that xv 6= 0.12 Indeed, if both xa = 0 and xv = 0 , then
everything is exogenous and we are back to the mechanical model.
Note that xv maintains the properties we expect: it is decreasing in h
and increasing in q, as can directly be seen from the expression.
Cumulative infection
Consider a symmetric initial condition. Since xv is decreasing in h, it means
that now when h increases we have the direct effect on CI which is increasing,
plus a decrease in vaccination, which further increases the effect on CI. The
effect of xa, which is of the opposite sign, disappears in the computations, so
we have exactly the same behavior as in the interior solution, and, moreover,
in this case the negative effect of h on CI is even stronger. The derivatives
are:
∂CI
∂h
= − k
2(q − 1)qρv0
2µ(k(h(µ− 1)q + µ− µq) + µ− 1)2
∂CI
∂qa
=
kρv0((h− 1)kq + k + 1)
2(k(h(µ− 1)q + µ− µq) + µ− 1)2
∂CI
∂xa
= − qρ
v
0((h− 1)kq + k + 1)2
2(k(h(µ− 1)q + µ− µq) + µ− 1)2
∂CI
∂xv
=
(q − 1)ρv0((h− 1)kq + k + 1)2
2(k(h(µ− 1)q + µ− µq) + µ− 1)2
(16)
(17)
(18)
(19)
12This is possible if hk
2+k
hkq−kq+k+1 < d <
1
k
and either k < 1 or(
1 < k < 1
2
(
1 +
√
5
) ∧ 0 < q < −k2+k+1
k
∧ 0 < h < −k2−kq+k+1
k3−kq
)
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Endogenous cultural types
The socialization payoffs are:
∆V a = −kσa + dkσv + 1
2
k2σ2v + kσv (1− kσv)
=
k(2(d− hk)((h− 1)kq + k + 1)− k)
2((h− 1)kq + k + 1)2
∆V v = kσa − 1
2
k2σ2v − kσv (1− kσv)
=
k2(2h((h− 1)kq + k + 1) + 1)
2((h− 1)kq + k + 1)2
(20)
(21)
(22)
(23)
We can apply the intermediate value theorem provided ∆V a does not be-
come negative. ∆V a(q = 0) = −k(2(k+1)(hk−d)+k)
2(k+1)2
. If h < 12 , this is positive
under the condition hk
2+k
hkq−kq+k+1 < d. So for h small enough we get an
interior solution for α < 0.
It is not possible to obtain analytical results in the case with q endoge-
nous. Nevertheless, numerical simulations reveal a picture very similar to
the one described in the case of interior solution, in the main text. Specifi-
cally, the magnitude of α is crucial to determine the effect of an increase in
homophily, as illustrated in Figure 8. Again the main mechanism through
which homophily acts is via the increased length of the outbreak, as mea-
sured by the leading eigenvalue, as shown in Figure 9.
α=-0.1α=-1α=-4
0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
h
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
CI
Figure 8: Cumulative infection as function of homophily in the equilibrium
where xa = 0. The other parameters are set at k = 1, d = 0.6, µ = 0.7,
ρa0 = ρ
v
0 = 0.1.
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Figure 9: Eigenvalues in the equilibrium where xa = 0. The other parame-
ters are set at k = 1, d = 0.6, µ = 0.7, ρa0 = ρ
v
0 = 0.1
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C Endogenous groups
C.1 A simple model of intragenerational cultural transmis-
sion
In this section we illustrate how equation (1) with α = −1 can arise from a
simple adaptation of the Bisin and Verdier (2001) model to an intragenera-
tional context.
At each time period, each agent meets another agent selected randomly.
When they meet, they are assigned two roles: the influencer and the target.
The incentive for the influencer is based only on other–regarding preferences,
for two reasons: it is consistent with some survey evidence (Ku¨mpel et al.
2015, Walsh et al. 2004), and second in this economy every agent has neg-
ligible impact on the spread of the disease, so socialization effort cannot
be driven by the desire to minimize the probability of infection, or similar
motivations.
The timing of the model is as follows.
• before the matching, agents choose a proselitism effort level τat , τvt ;
• when 2 agents meet, if they share the same cultural trait nothing
happens. Otherwise, one is selected at random with probability 12 to
exert the effort and try to have the other change cultural trait.
The fraction of cultural types evolves according to:
qat+1 = q
a
t P
aa
t + (1− qat )P vat , (24)
where the transition rates P aat , P
va
t are determined by effort:
P aat = q˜
a
t + (1− q˜at )
1
2
+ (1− q˜at )
1
2
(1− τvt ),
P vat = τ
v
t
1
2
(1− q˜at ),
(25)
(26)
which yield the following discrete time dynamics:
∆qat = q
a
t (1− qat )(1− h)∆τt. (27)
Effort has a psychological cost, which, as in Bisin and Verdier (2001),
we assume quadratic. Hence, agents at the beginning of each period (before
the matching happens) solve the following problem:
max
τat
−(τ
a
t )
2
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
cost of effort
+ qat U
aa
t + (1− qat )
1
2
(τat U
aa
t + (1− τat )Uavt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected social payoff
, (28)
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which yields as a solution:
τat = (1− qat ) (Uaat − Uavt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
”cultural intolerance”
,
τvt = (1− qvt )(Uvvt − Uvat ).
(29)
(30)
Hence, the dynamics implied by our assumptions is:
∆qat = q
a
t (1− qat )((1− qat )∆Ua − qvt ∆Uv). (31)
The steady state of this dynamics is determined by the equation:
(1− qat )∆Ua = qvt ∆Uv (32)
which is precisely the steady state implied by (1) when α = −1.
C.2 Socialization payoffs
We have:
Uv→v =−
∫ k·σv
0
c dc−
∫ 1
k·σv
(k · σv) dc ;
Ua→a =−
∫ k·σa−d
0
(c+ d) dc−
∫ 1
k·σa−d
(k · σa) dc ;
Uv→a =−
∫ k·σa−d
0
c dc−
∫ 1
k·σa−d
(k · σa) dc ;
Ua→v =−
∫ k·σv
0
(c+ d) dc−
∫ 1
k·σv
(k · σv) dc .
(33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
Integration and the use of 10 yields:
∆Ua =
1
2
(xv − xa)2 − (d− (xv − xa)) (1− xv)
=
d
(
d
(−2(h− 1)hk2q + k + 1)− 2hk(hk + 1))
2(k + 1)(hk + 1)2
∆Uv =
1
2
(xv − xa)2 + (d− (xv − xa)) (1− xa)
=
d(d(2hk((h− 1)kq + k + 1) + k + 1) + 2hk(hk + 1))
2(k + 1)(hk + 1)2
(37)
(38)
(39)
(40)
Figure 10 shows the composition of ∆Uv = Uv→v − Uv→a. It is the
analogous of Figure 1 for ∆Ua.
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cost c
disutility
kσv Disutility of a as perceived by v
1kσa − d kσakσv
kσa
Disutility of a as perceived by v
Figure 10: Composition of ∆Uv. The area below the black line is Uv→v, the
are below the red line is Uv→a, ∆Uv is the red area.
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D Proofs
Proof or Result 1
Proof. To analyse stability, we need to identify the values of parameters for
which the Jacobian matrix of the system is negative definite when calculated
in (0, 0). The matrix is:
J =
(
(1− xa) q˜a − µ (xa − 1) (q˜a − 1)
(xv − 1) (q˜v − 1) (1− xv) q˜v − µ
)
We can directly compute the eigenvalues, which are:
e1 = µˆ− µ
e2 = µˆ− µ−∆.
where µˆ := 12 (T + ∆) ∈ [0, 1], T := q˜a(1 − xa) + q˜v(1 − xv), and ∆ :=√
T 2 − 4h(1− xa)(1− xv).
The eigenvalues are real and distinct because, given (x + y)2 > 4xy
whenever x 6= y, we get
∆2 = T 2 − 4h(1− xa)(1− xv) ≥ 4q˜a(1− xa)q˜v(1− xv)− 4h(1− xa)(1− xv)
Now q˜aq˜v = h2 + h(1− h) + (1− h)2q(1− q) ≥ h, so we conclude ∆2 > 0.
Since eigenvalues are all distinct, the matrix is diagonalizable, and it
is negative definite whenever the eigenvalues are negative. Inspecting the
expression, this happens whenever µ > µˆ.
Cumulative infection
Lemma 1. Let (ρa0, ρ
v
0) be the infected share for each group at the outbreak.
Then in the linearized approximation around the (0,0) steady state:
CIa =
2 [ρa0 (µ− (1− xv)q˜v) + ρv0 (1− xa) (1− q˜a)]
(T − 2µ−∆)(T − 2µ+ ∆) ;
CIv =
2 [ρa0 (1− xv) (1− q˜v) + ρv0 (µ− (1− xa)q˜a)]
(T − 2µ−∆)(T − 2µ+ ∆) ;
CI =
2 [ρa0 (µ+ (1− xv)(1− 2q˜v)) + ρv0 (µ+ (1− xa)(1− 2q˜a))]
(T − 2µ−∆)(T − 2µ+ ∆) .
(41)
(42)
(43)
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Proof. The linearized dynamics is:
d˙ρ(t) = Mdρ(t)
dρ(0) = ρ0
where ρ0 = (ρ
a
0, ρ
v
0), and:
M11 =
1
∆
e
1
2
t(T−2µ)
(
sinh
(
∆t
2
)(
−xaq˜a + q˜a − µ+ 1
2
(2µ− T )
)
+
1
2
∆ cosh
(
∆t
2
))
M12 =
1
∆
(1− xa) (1− q˜a) sinh
(
∆t
2
)
e
1
2
t(T−2µ)
M21 =
1
∆
(1− xv) (1− q˜v) sinh
(
∆t
2
)
e
1
2
t(T−2µ)
M22 =
1
∆
e
1
2
t(T−2µ)
(
sinh
(
∆t
2
)(
−xv q˜v + q˜v − µ+ 1
2
(2µ− T )
)
+
1
2
∆ cosh
(
∆t
2
))
The cumulative infection in time in the two groups can be calculated
analytically by integration, since it is just a sum of exponential terms. In-
tegration yield, for CIv:
CIv =
∫ ∞
0
dρv(t)dt
=
2 (ρa0 (1− xv) (1− q˜v) + ρv0 (µ− (1− xa)q˜a))
(−∆− 2µ+ T )(∆− 2µ+ T ) +
lim
t−>∞ e
1
2
t(T−2µ)
(
2∆ cosh
(
∆t
2
)
(ρa0 (xv − 1) (q˜v − 1) + ρv0 ((1− xv)q˜v + µ− T )) +
sinh
(
∆t
2
)(
ρv0
(
(T − 2µ) (2 (xv − 1) q˜v + T ) + ∆2
)− 2ρa0(T − 2µ) (xv − 1) (q˜v − 1)))
and the limit is zero if µ > µˆ because the leading term is Exp
(
1
2 t(T − 2µ) + ∆2
)
=
µˆ− µ. An analogous reasoning for CIa yields:
CIa =
∫ ∞
0
dρa(t)dt =
2 (ρa0 (µ− (1− xv)q˜v) + ρv0 (1− xa) (1− q˜a))
(−∆− 2µ+ T )(∆− 2µ+ T )
CIv =
∫ ∞
0
dρv(t)dt =
2 (ρa0 (1− xv) (1− q˜v) + ρv0 (µ− (1− xa)q˜a))
(−∆− 2µ+ T )(∆− 2µ+ T )
(44)
(45)
The total CI in the population is CI = qaCIa + (1− qa)CIv
CI =
2
(−∆− 2µ+ T )(∆− 2µ+ T ) (q
a (ρa0 (µ− (1− xv)q˜v) + ρv0 (1− xa) (1− q˜a)) +
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(1− qa) (ρ0a (1− xv) (1− q˜v) + ρ0v (µ− (1− xa)q˜a)))
= ρa0
2 (qa (µ− (1− xv)q˜v) + (1− qa) (1− xv) (1− q˜v))
(−∆− 2µ+ T )(∆− 2µ+ T ) +
ρv0
2(qa (1− xa) (1− q˜a) + (1− qa) (µ− (1− xa)q˜a))
(−∆− 2µ+ T )(∆− 2µ+ T )
Proofs for Result 3
First, note that µ > µˆ implies:
µ >1− xa > h(1− xa)
µ >1− xv > h(1− xv)
µ >
h(1− xa)
1− (1− h)q
µ >
h(1− xv)
1− hq
The expressions of the derivatives are:
∂CIa
∂h
=
(q − 1) (xa − 1) (µ+ xv − 1) (ρa0 (µ+ xv − 1)− ρv0 (xa + µ− 1))
2 (hµ (−qxa + xa + qxv − 1) + h (xa − 1) (xv − 1) + µ (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1)) 2
∂CIa
∂qa
=
(h− 1) (xa − 1) (h (xv − 1) + µ) (ρa0 (µ+ xv − 1)− ρv0 (xa + µ− 1))
2 (hµ (−qxa + xa + qxv − 1) + h (xa − 1) (xv − 1) + µ (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1)) 2
∂CIa
∂xa
=
((h− 1)q (xv − 1) + µ+ xv − 1) (µ(h(q − 1)− q) (ρa0 − ρv0)− hρa0 (xv − 1)− µρv0)
2 (hµ (−qxa + xa + qxv − 1) + h (xa − 1) (xv − 1) + µ (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1)) 2
∂CIa
∂xv
=
(h− 1)(q − 1) (xa − 1) (µ ((h− 1)q (ρv0 − ρa0) + ρv0) + h (xa − 1) ρv0)
2 (hµ (−qxa + xa + qxv − 1) + h (xa − 1) (xv − 1) + µ (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1)) 2
∂CIv
∂h
=
q (xv − 1) (xa + µ− 1) (ρa0 (µ+ xv − 1)− ρv0 (xa + µ− 1))
2 (hµ (−qxa + xa + qxv − 1) + h (xa − 1) (xv − 1) + µ (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1)) 2
∂CIv
∂qa
=
(h− 1) (xv − 1) (h (xa − 1) + µ) (ρa0 (µ+ xv − 1)− ρv0 (xa + µ− 1))
2 (hµ (−qxa + xa + qxv − 1) + h (xa − 1) (xv − 1) + µ (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1)) 2
∂CIv
∂xa
= − (h− 1)q (xv − 1) (hρ
a
0 (µ+ µ(−q) + xv − 1) + µqρa0 + (h− 1)µ(q − 1)ρv0)
2 (hµ (−qxa + xa + qxv − 1) + h (xa − 1) (xv − 1) + µ (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1)) 2
∂CIv
∂xv
=
(h(q − 1) (xa − 1) + q (−xa)− µ+ q) (µ ((h− 1)q (ρv0 − ρa0) + ρv0) + h (xa − 1) ρv0)
2 (hµ (−qxa + xa + qxv − 1) + h (xa − 1) (xv − 1) + µ (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1)) 2
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and combining them, we get:
∂CI
∂h
=
µ(q − 1)q (xa − xv) (ρa0 (µ+ xv − 1)− ρv0 (xa + µ− 1))
2 (hµ (−qxa + xa + qxv − 1) + h (xa − 1) (xv − 1) + µ (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1)) 2
∂CI
∂qa
=
(h− 1) (ρa0 (µ+ xv − 1)− ρv0 (xa + µ− 1)) (h (xa − 1) (xv − 1) + µ (q (xa − xv) + xv − 1))
2 (hµ (−qxa + xa + qxv − 1) + h (xa − 1) (xv − 1) + µ (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1)) 2
∂CI
∂xa
= − q (h (xv − 1) + µ) (hρ
a
0 (µ+ µ(−q) + xv − 1) + µqρa0 + (h− 1)µ(q − 1)ρv0)
2 (hµ (−qxa + xa + qxv − 1) + h (xa − 1) (xv − 1) + µ (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1)) 2
∂CI
∂xv
=
(q − 1) (h (xa − 1) + µ) (µ ((h− 1)q (ρv0 − ρa0) + ρv0) + h (xa − 1) ρv0)
2 (hµ (−qxa + xa + qxv − 1) + h (xa − 1) (xv − 1) + µ (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1)) 2
Note that all the denominators are positive, so to control the sign from
now on we focus on the numerators. In particular, recognising the numera-
tors of the first two as precisely the terms arising in 4 we can conclude that
CI is increasing in h if and only if CIa > CIv and CI is increasing in q if
and only if CIa > CIv.
If initial conditions are symmetric:
∂CIa
∂h
> 0⇐⇒− (q − 1)ρa0 (xa − 1) (xa − xv) (µ+ xv − 1) > 0
∂CIa
∂qa
> 0⇐⇒− (h− 1)ρa0 (xa − 1) (xa − xv) (h (xv − 1) + µ) > 0
∂CIa
∂xa
> 0⇐⇒− ρa0 (h (xv − 1) + µ) (µ− (1− h)(1− q) (1− xv)) > 0
∂CIa
∂xv
> 0⇐⇒(h− 1)(q − 1)ρa0 (xa − 1) (h (xa − 1) + µ) > 0
Now, using the first four inequalities presented above, we can conclude that
∂CIa
∂h > 0,
∂CIa
∂qa > 0,
∂CIa
∂xa < 0 and
∂CIa
∂xv < 0. Similarly, if ρ
a
0 = 0:
∂CIa
∂h
> 0⇐⇒− (q − 1) (xa − 1) ρv0 (xa + µ− 1) (µ+ xv − 1) > 0
∂CIa
∂qa
> 0⇐⇒− (h− 1) (xa − 1) ρv0 (xa + µ− 1) (h (xv − 1) + µ) > 0
∂CIa
∂xa
> 0⇐⇒− (1− h)(1− q)ρv0 (µ− (1− q)(1− h)(1− xv)) > 0
∂CIa
∂xv
> 0⇐⇒(h− 1)(q − 1) (xa − 1) ρv0 (h (xa − 1) + µ ((h− 1)q + 1)) > 0
and we conclude that ∂CI
a
∂h < 0,
∂CIa
∂qa < 0,
∂CIa
∂xa < 0 and
∂CIa
∂xv < 0.
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If ρv0 = 0:
∂CIa
∂h
> 0⇐⇒(q − 1)ρa0 (xa − 1) (µ+ xv − 1) 2 > 0
∂CIa
∂qa
> 0⇐⇒(h− 1)ρa0 (xa − 1) (µ+ xv − 1) (h (xv − 1) + µ) > 0
∂CIa
∂xa
> 0⇐⇒− ρa0 (µ− (1− q)(1− h)(1− xv)) (h (µ− (1− xv)) + µ(1− h)q) > 0
∂CIa
∂xv
> 0⇐⇒− (h− 1)2µ(q − 1)qρa0 (xa − 1) > 0
and we conclude that ∂CI
a
∂h > 0,
∂CIa
∂qa > 0,
∂CIa
∂xa < 0 and
∂CIa
∂xv < 0.
The other cases are analogous.
Proof of Result 4
The linearized dynamics is (from Lemma 1):
ρ˙a =
1
∆
e
1
2
t(T−2µ)
(
sinh
(
∆t
2
)(
−xaq˜a + q˜a − 1
2
T
)
+
1
2
∆ cosh
(
∆t
2
))
ρa0
+
1
∆
(1− xa) (1− q˜a) sinh
(
∆t
2
)
e
1
2
t(T−2µ)ρv0
ρ˙v =
1
∆
(1− xv) (1− q˜v) sinh
(
∆t
2
)
e
1
2
t(T−2µ)ρa0
+
1
∆
e
1
2
t(T−2µ)
(
sinh
(
∆t
2
)(
−xv q˜v + q˜v − 1
2
T
)
+
1
2
∆ cosh
(
∆t
2
))
ρv0
In particular, it depends on µ just through the exponential term e
1
2
t(T−2µ).
So we can rewrite it as:
ρ˙a = e
1
2
t(T−2µ)A(t)
ρ˙v = e
1
2
t(T−2µ)V(t)
where A(t) and V(t) do not depend on µ. Now the discounted cumulative
infection for antivaxxers is equal to:
CIa =
∫ ∞
0
e−βte
1
2
t(T−2µ)A(t)dt =
∫ ∞
0
e
1
2
t(T−2(µ+β))A(t)dt
which is precisely the expression for the non discounted cumulative infection
in a model where the recovery rate is µ′ = µ+ β.
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Proof of Result 6
From the proof of Result 1, the eigenvalues are:
e1 = µˆ− µ
e2 = µˆ− µ−∆.
Moreover, they are both decreasing in absolute value as h increases (this is
easy to see for e1, given that µˆ is positive and increases in h, but it holds
also for e2).
Proof of Proposition 1
We have:(
dCI
dq
)∣∣h=0 =
(
∂CI
∂q
)∣∣h=0 +
(
∂CI
∂xa
∂xa
∂q
+
∂CI
∂xv
∂xv
∂q
)∣∣h=0
The first term can be obtained setting h = 0 in the expressions from the
proof of Result 3:(
∂CI
∂q
)∣∣h=0 = (k + 1) (ρ
a
0 (µ+ x
v − 1)− ρv0 (xa + µ− 1))
2(k + 1) (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1) 2
The correction term instead is:(
∂CI
∂xa
∂xa
∂q
+
∂CI
∂xv
∂xv
∂q
)∣∣h=0 = dk ((q − 1)ρ
v
0 − qρa0)
2(k + 1) (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1) 2
which is negative: so endogenizing the vaccination choices always yields
a smaller effect of a change in q. Moreover, if the initial conditions are
symmetric the numerator of the derivative becomes:
(k + 1)(xv − xa)− dk = (k + 1)d− dk = d > 0
so CI is still increasing in q, but at a lower rate.
Similarly, the derivative with respect to h is:(
dCI
dh
)∣∣h=0 =
(
∂CI
∂h
)∣∣h=0 +
(
∂CI
∂xa
∂xa
∂h
+
∂CI
∂xv
∂xv
∂h
)∣∣h=0
and the correction term is null:(
∂CI
∂xa
∂xa
∂h
+
∂CI
∂xv
∂xv
∂h
)∣∣h=0 =
−dkq (q − 1) (ρ
v
0 − q (ρv0 − ρa0))
2 (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1) 2−dk(q−1)
q (µqρa0 − µ(q − 1)ρv0)
2µ (q (xa − xv) + µ+ xv − 1) 2 = 0
so the derivative is exactly the same as in Result 3.
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Proof of Proposition 2
Consider the function F (q) = qα∆Ua−(1−q)α∆Uv. Both ∆Ua and ∆Uv are
bounded from above and bounded away from 0, so when q → 0 the negative
term remains bounded while qα →∞ (because α < 0). The reverse happens
when q → 1.
Concerning stability, we can calculate the derivative of the function F :
dF
dq
=
d
2(k + 1)(hk + 1)2
×
(
aqa−1
(
d
(−2(h− 1)hk2q + k + 1)− 2hk(hk + 1))− 2d(h− 1)hk2 (qa + (1− q)a)
+a(1− q)a−1 (2d(h− 1)hk2q + d(k + 1)(2hk + 1) + 2hk(hk + 1)))
If q → 0, dFdq → −∞, whereas if q → 1 dFdq → +∞, so that, by continuity,
there must be a stable steady state. If if h→ 0, dFdq → αd221−α < 0, so for
h in a neighborhood of 0 the steady state is unique and stable.
Proof of Proposition 3
For h = 0 we have that q = 12 . We can compute the derivative using the
implicit function theorem. The first derivative is above. The second is
dF
dh
=
d
2(k + 1)(hk + 1)2
×
dk ((1− q)a(hk(d(−(k + 2)q + k + 1)− 1) + dkq − 1)− qa(d(kq(h(k + 2)− 1) + k + 1) + hk + 1))
so that:
dq
dh
∣∣∣h=0 = −
dF
dh
dF
dq
=
2k + dk
α(2d+ 2dk)
and we can see that q is always decreasing with homophily, but with a
different level of intensity according to the magnitude of α.
Proof of Proposition 4
Using the implicit function theorem, we can analyze the behavior of cumu-
lative infection for h close to 0:
dCI
dh
∣∣∣h=0 = (k + 1)4(dk − 2(k + 1)µ+ 2)2
(
4(d+ 2)k(ddρvk + (k + 1)µ(dρa− dρv)− dρa + dρv)
ad(k + 1)
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+
dk
(
dρa
(
dk2 + 2(k + 1)µ− 2)+ dρv(dk(k + 2)− 2(k + 1)µ+ 2))
µ
)
With a symmetric initial condition we get:
dCI
dh
∣∣∣h=0 = dρak
2
(
ad2(k + 1)2 + 2(d+ 2)µ
)
2aµ(dk − 2(k + 1)µ+ 2)2
which is positive if α < −2dµ−4µ
d2k2+2d2k+d2
and negative otherwise.
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